The Middle East Quagmire
Amb Ranjan Mathai Speech Transcript
First of all, we need to understand that we are currently talking, essentially, about the conflict between Iran and Israel. But there are 3 or 4 separate wars, in some ways interconnected, going on in Gaza, Lebanon, the Houthi attacks on Israel, some attacks from Iraq, as well as the main theatre which is Israel and Iran. We can deal with the other theatres, if necessary, but I am dealing with Iran and Israel because that is the one with the greatest potential for becoming a wider war, creating a quagmire.
The Iran-Israel conflict, as it is emerging, is essentially an aerial war. There has been one interesting survey by Kenneth Pollack about the possibilities of it becoming a ground war or even a naval clash of navies or an attack on each other's coast. I would recommend that article to anybody interested. But after a long survey, he concludes that it seems very unlikely, to the point of impossibility, that we will see a ground or naval war. The last time a country that is not a neighbour of Israel got involved in a ground war was probably Iraq in 1973, but that was a long time ago, and that was a very different situation.
Right now, as the war is emerging, it seems clear that Israel has the upper hand, but its strategy seems to be changing. As some other analysts and I have seen, the basic element of Israeli strategy is the concept of escalation dominance.
However much the war begins to escalate, you remain the dominant force in choosing to escalate the level to which you escalate and leaving the adversary to raise the stakes or deciding not to. Israel has, I think, shifted away from this to some extent to classical deterrence; in this context, let me clarify that it still has, of course, the sheer technological and military advantage. Still, it is, I think, interpreting deterrence right now as the lack of response from Iran can be shown as an Israeli victory, which many analysts would say probably is accurate given the state of Iran's inability to respond or failure to respond so far. Even though the Iranian rhetoric says it is a draw, I think Israel is satisfied with the kind of deterrence achieved presently with the level of the last attack they carried out.
Earlier, when Israel said it was going to carry out a response to the October 1st missile attack on Israel, it said the short form for describing that was DPS, deadly, pinpoint and surprising. It's been pinpointed alright; it's been surprising, but perhaps not in the way that was first projected, and it has been somewhat less deadly than was originally intended by the Israelis. But I think Israel has also demonstrated that it can carry out both a deadly and a surprising attack.
When you look at it, they were operating 1000 miles, 1600 kilometres from their air bases. They seem to have used, probably, the border region between Syria and Jordan to enter and overfly Iraq. We still need to find out exactly the trajectories and routes chosen, but from everything I have read, they were undetected en- route.
They operated not just in one strike; there were three waves of attacks, and there was no indication of serious resistance to even the second or the third wave of attacks. So that is, I think, a demonstration of what can be done if they put their minds to it. But let us look at the claims of what they attacked: They said they attacked a missile and rocket production facility.
They attacked an S-300 aerial defence system and suppressed it, as well as some other important military-industrial sites. That seems to have been what they chose to do. However, the earlier argument was that they had three objectives if they really wanted to hit.
One is the leadership, the second is the nuclear facilities, and the third is oil. By attacking the way they did, they have demonstrated that, if necessary, all three targets are available to them. Khuzestan, an unusual target to choose, is actually where the Iranian oil industry started.
So if they choose to go back there and can enter undetected, they can hit oil production facilities, if not the transport. Karaj and Parchin—Parchin is a military base, and Karaj is not too far from the homes of important nuclear sites.
The S-300 and other anti-aircraft systems defend Tehran, the leadership, and several military facilities. So, I think the ability to attack any of these shows that the potential for escalation- an upward spiral- is demonstrated; though it does not seem likely to be implemented right now.
Iran seems to have decided to pause. This assessment is based on what they have said, ‘we have the right to defend ourselves’ but also want to ‘uphold’—these are the words they used—'responsibility for regional peace and stability’.
Most analysts see that statement signifying that Iran has decided to take the hit and play for time. Will they stay that way if Hezbollah continues to get degraded? If there are other attacks in, say, Yemen or Iraq, which Israel chooses to follow up with? One doesn't know. However, the Iranian strategy seems to be to play for time. Now why? Iran needs time. Its domestic situation is not very happy; if anything, its economy and its internal cohesion are showing signs of weakening.
By all accounts, the current President, Pezeshkian, who was a surprise choice when the elections took place a few months ago, has been brought in with the approval of the Supreme Leader for the very specific purpose of giving the Iranian economy some breathing space. By getting some sanctions lifted and by restoring some of the normal trade that Iran can undertake. It would also seek to get the release some of its blocked assets, but that's further down.
It needs a restoration of the normal oil trade. Blowing that up through a military strategy is currently not in Pezeshkian’s outlook. If the Supreme Leader is backing Pezeshkian rather than some of the hotheads and the noisy people you hear, who make threats, etc., that's likely to hold. .The Supreme Leader in Iran wields considerable authority over the IRGC, the money flow, and the intelligence apparatus. So the present approach seems to have been the main strategy.
Why did Israel choose to reduce the intensity of its strike? When I say reduce the intensity, I am not assuming to have insight into what exactly the cabinet decided in Israel. However, from statements made earlier, it seems that they reduced the intensity of their response to Iran's attacks. Fundamentally, they seem to have calculated that they cannot afford a miscalculation in how the US will assess what they choose to do. The election is close by.
It's an extremely sensitive time in US politics. And from some statements that he has made, Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu seems to be at least hoping for Trump to return. Whether that's a calculated hope or expectation, that seems part of the strategy.
But it's also an assessment that an attack on, say, the oil or nuclear facilities could shake up the regional situation in potentially destabilising ways. An attack on the nuclear facilities would probably have led Iran to choose weaponisation. There is still, the Israelis believe, a window of opportunity to stop that if they choose to. It is assumed from some calculations of the level of uranium enrichment they have carried out that it's only a matter of a few weeks before they have the ability to make an explosive. But there is a longer gap between making an explosive and a deliverable weapon. And that is something that could be exploited. But it's an extremely dangerous gambit because no one is 100% sure an attack can be carried out in a way that halts the weaponization drive effectively.
The oil markets (and I am happy to discuss this further) would have been seriously shaken up. An attack on Iran's oil facilities, its oil production or its oil transportation would have led, according to the Iranians, to a response in attacking the nearest available oil facilities of the allies of the US. Now Iran has, in recent times, been going out of its way to make an outreach for more friendly ties with most of these countries. So, it may appear not to make political sense to attack them. But if pushed to the wall, that's a strategy they might choose-to ignite the region. And that would have just unravelled world oil markets to an extent. It would have thrown the international economy out of gear for a while. And hence, I think, the Israelis in their calculation may have decided attacking Iranian oil facilities is too dangerous, given they don't know how the US would respond to that. Now, why do I keep going back to the US each time when I talk about Israeli calculations? I assess that while Israel has formidable military and technological capacities, right now, it needs US assistance quite critically.
The Israelis know, they have to rely on maintaining a very solid line of communication with whoever is the decision-making authority in Washington. Presently it's Biden and his team, the Pentagon, the CIA, the State Department, all these major players. Their support has to be kept steady.
What are the indications that point to such a need for support? In 2022, Israel spent about 4-5% of its GDP on defence. According to published figures, its military expenditures doubled in 2023 alone. From 12-15% of the budget, they're probably hitting 30-35% right now, close to 9% of GDP. I am calculating that expenditures have risen higher this year because of the intensity of these three or four different wars.
How long will they be able to carry this on? The last tranche of US assistance was $18 billion. The total Israeli GDP is around $500 billion. Calculate what percentage of GDP is coming as US assistance. Now, this is only assistance on the economy. The economy, of course, takes a toll to see through when you are in the midst of a war. When you are in a war, you sacrifice your GDP and economy. When pushed to the wall, every country in the world would do it.
But even on its defensive capability, I think Israel's vulnerabilities are beginning to show up. US resupplies for munitions have been reported extensively. But not much has been written on Israel’s critical missile defence. The Iron Dome and the Arrow systems, which have successfully held off the missile attacks from Hamas, from Hezbollah, and then the big Iranian barrage in April and the larger barrage in October, have begun to get depleted . Attrition is beginning to show.
A very large percentage (according to a set of figures I have seen as much as 40%) of the further supply of interceptor missiles for the anti-missile defence of the Iron Dome and Arrow will have to come from American sources, as production lines of Israeli industries struggle to replace stocks which are rapidly depleted. The Americans are spending like nobody's business in Ukraine already. So, will there be an unlimited supply available? I think this is a very big question mark in the decision- makers' minds. So, I feel this is one element that the Israeli cabinet would have taken into account, and decided ; We need to keep the Americans on side. Stay within limits where they will be completely in sync with us.
There is another fact pointing to this. The Americans have installed the theatre high-altitude air defence system (THAAD) in Israel with US personnel. Now, this has been seen everywhere as America’s unlimited support and commitment to Israel. I agree. But when I was in Israel 25 years back – a long time ago-. I think most people in the Israeli Air Force and defence hierarchy would not have liked such deployment of US forces. There have been cases, as when the peace deal with Egypt was signed, and maybe a few other occasions when US troops were based on the territory of Israel. But if you go back in Israeli history, whether it was the 1967 War, 1973 War or any other war, Israelis have not thought it's a great idea to have other forces based on their territory because they would not be fully under Israeli control. They would take command orders from their own hierarchy. Based on my experience, the Israelis would not like to countenance that situation for any extended period of time. At present however Israel needs the US facilities. I could be corrected, but that is one element in their strategy.
Even in this latest attack, President Herzog is said to have remarked that Israel is thankful to the US for some support, and then he added ‘some of it covert, some of it overt’. This suggests that in this latest round, the US seems to have pitched in. To that extent, being able to control the flow of events as they occur. So that is where Israel finds itself now, and that is why I think the situation will not spiral out of control presently. It appears that keeping some control over the next steps,is in the minds of the decision-makers in Israel, in Iran and certainly in the United States.
As I mentioned, Iran's internal situation is fairly grim. The IRGC is believed to have factions within it. The IRGC are the key military players in Iran, whether it's the rocket force, whether it's ground forces, whether it's resupply to Lebanon, whatever the strategy. It is believed the internal rifts in the IRGC are serious; there's even a rumour that Soleimani's successor, General Qaani, had been investigated, on allegations of being an Israeli asset. One doesn't know if this is true, but there are clear signs of internal rifts within the IRGC, just as there are rifts within the Iranian clerical establishment.
Now, why is this significant? Because if there are rifts, you can have rogue elements who might choose to ratchet up the situation, but right now, it does not look like it. It looks like all the military forces are under the tight control of some central leadership. In Israel, you have a cabinet that has members who have not liked the response that was delivered to the Iranians. They have vocally said so, and demand more. People like Smotrich and Ben-Gvir are ministers holding high responsibilities. However, from the statements I have read, they are urging Prime Minister Netanyahu to dismiss the Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. From the external world's point of view if there is one stabilizing force in the Israeli cabinet, it is General Gallant. So, if these pressures build up and they can make a change in the Israeli cabinet, you can have a change in decision, which could change the war strategy.
But as I said, these are uncertainties because the US will remain, I think, a very strong presence in Israel for some time to come. And the US today, in my judgment, is the only player capable of affecting all decisions. Last year, we heard with much fanfare about the Chinese coming in and getting Iran and Saudi Arabia to reach some sort of rapprochement, if not a peace deal.
But what have they been able to do in the last year? Absolutely nothing. They cannot affect the situation on the ground. They cannot affect Israeli decision-making in any way, The Chinese know they cannot influence the emerging situation.
Russia has had the ability, to be an influential actor in the region. In 2015, it looked like Syria was going to be destroyed. Internal opponents, with the support of many others in the Arab world, many in the Western world were determined to bring the Assad regime down. The Russians put a stop to that. At that time, Putin just sent air force contingents in to Syria. He deployed Russian naval ships to Latakia in support of the Assad regime, enabling it to hold on.
Putin and the Russians have the capacity to strengthen the Iranian regime. But after two years of war in Ukraine and the degradation of their abilities, I think they are not in a position to influence anything in West Asia to the same extent as earlier. (Incidentally, I use the expression West Asia, not Middle East.)
So I think it's in the American hands, and the ball is in their court, and it looks like they would like to see things return to some kind of normalcy. The latest indications are that Mr. Barnea, Mossad's head, is again flying to Doha. Once again, you will have the CIA chief and the others coming, and the Qataris are going to have one more go at seeing if some kind of ceasefire can be brought about in Gaza. I think it's going to be difficult because I don't see any way in which Prime Minister Netanyahu can agree to a ceasefire in Gaza, even if Hamas continues to exist, unless the hostages are released first. That is politically important today for his survival. So, we will know whether Hamas is now so weakened that Israel can get the hostages out as a first move.
Lebanon is the wild card because the Hezbollah have shown great resilience. They took an absolute beating, the virtual decapitation of their leadership, the destruction of a large number of their cadres and right now, possibly a disruption in their supply line to Iran. It looks like the aerial attacks from Israel into Syria could have achieved that. But they are holding a line, as it were, and in that area near the borders with Israel, they have demonstrated they can still fight.
Every single Israeli incursion has led to casualties, and Hezbollah have switched their communications to very old, almost primitive systems, landlines, personal communications and so on. They can't trust their mobiles, their pagers or even their radio communications because they have been thoroughly penetrated. But in the front lines, they are still alive, and it seems that they still have effective control centres for some of their rockets and drone forces. I was reading an Israeli account of the attack on Binyamina, the one near Haifa, where four people were killed. (I haven't read any details about Caesarea, where they attacked Netanyahu's house.) The Binyamina attack was very interesting. It suggested that the drones went out over the Mediterranean Sea and came back in from the Mediterranean coast. At one point, they seemed to have disappeared from the radar and came back just in time to hit the target.
How was that controlled? That suggests that Hezbollah's capacities in this southern belt, where the real fighting is, are still operational. They have been seriously degraded, but they are not yet finished. But can they sustain a war if the Iranians cannot or do not resupply them? My feeling is they cannot.
What are the indications that that situation could come back to normal? The US is trying a parallel track for cease fire in Lebanon. For the first time in many years, the Lebanese government woke up and discovered UN Resolution 1701. For 20 years, people have been telling them there would be peace if they implement 1701.What's the most important element of 1701? That would mean putting a clamp on Hezbollah; not allowing them to operate on the southern border. If you asked Indian soldiers who served in UNIFIL, they would tell you anytime the real problem for implementing 1701 is Hezbollah. The problem is not a few Lebanese villagers or the Israelis.
Lebanese Prime Minister Mikati said the time has come to implement 1701 and to get enough international backing to do it. Will Hezbollah play ball? I don't know. If Iran chooses, they can go that way, but my hunch is they will not.
We may not see peace breaking out, but we may see a calming of the hostilities. This is how I see the current situation. If the Israeli-Iran war had spiralled upwards, I think the world would have been on the brink of a very major catastrophe.
It can still happen. As I said, the first target and first victim would be the world's oil markets. And today, who would be the first victims of a collapse in oil markets and trade? China is number one, and India is number two. Japan three, Korea four, European countries individually are lower down at four or five. The United States is sitting pretty. It does not have to worry to the same extent. So yes, whether in Bangalore or elsewhere, we need to worry that this situation will not spiral.
We have, we believe, built up adequate reserves of oil. My calculation is we have about 10 days oil requirements in the Strategic Reserves. Plus, stocks held in the refineries can last another few weeks. But anything more than 30 days of breakdown of supplies via the Strait of Hormuz, (through which even today, with all the Russian supplies, almost 50% of oil and gas imports are still coming) is a very serious threat.
More than that, it has lag effects on the global economy. What will it do to your exports? What will it do to your imports?
Finally, what would it mean if conflict spreads into the Gulf, where there are 8 million Indian expatriates? It's too horrible even to contemplate.
Thank you
Q+A Session
What consequences will the American Election have on the Israel-Gaza conflict, Sir?
I can't answer the question of who will become the next president. Either way I do not see great change in the overall conflict situation. A week ago, 10 days ago, if I were making this statement, I would say Israelis are waiting for Trump because Trump had said openly that he thinks Israel should go for the nuclear targets in Israel.
He has not said that since. I believe he is too preoccupied with the election, but I think he also feels that there are some risks to that. Not that he has any time for the Iranian regime.
I think he would support an attempt to see whether that regime can be brought down or changed internally to the point where it does not pose the kind of perceived threat that the Americans see from it. But there is one fact that he may be thinking about. I don't know definitively. because nobody knows exactly what's in his mind.
But that fact is that if, even assuming there is an attack on the leadership and the nuclear facilities and the regime begins to crumble, they still will have enough residual power to create trouble all around Which can only be dealt with if US is willing to wage war against Iran. Now, the Americans already know from Iraq that fighting a land war in West Asia is not going to be easy. And Iran's size is about 4 times that of Iraq. Its geographical terrain, features, mountains, and deserts are a formidable challenge to anyone who tries to do anything apart from some pinpoint attack, which will mean siding with one local faction against the other. But what US is worried about is if they get drawn into even this kind of a conflict, it will mean American boots on the ground, if not in Iran, all around in West Asia. If there is one thing Trump's supporters (the Make America Great Again guys who go around with all the funny hats and all that) do not want it's another war involving American troops in Asia. Again and again, Trump has said “I'll end the forever wars.” So, he's got to end them; and hence Trump would not want an open-ended commitment in which US gets militarily sucked in.
If there was assurance that Iran’s nuclear capabilities can be destroyed through surgical strikes, Trump might support it. But Iran is just too big a player for that kind of outcome. Its nuclear strategy cannot be curtailed unless there is ability to make a regime change, which I think is very unlikely at this point. Speculation continues but a change of regime does not seem on the cards in the near future.
On the Gaza conflict its harder to say what impact the election will have but there are differences in the nuances between the candidates. Much will depend on how soon Israel can bring an end to its destructive campaign, and what the war aims of the government are. Right now, the calculations within the Israeli cabinet on Gaza are very hard to judge. As I said, some feel that operations in Gaza must be limited; but they are clear there is no way they can afford a return to the status quo in that territory. That is, I think an issue on which there is complete consensus in Israel. There are no major differences.
But what does that mean on the ground? The best-case strategy currently being talked about by government figures is to have a permanent security presence running through Gaza, dividing it into two halves. But administering two million people will have to be somebody else's job.
Israel with US support could probably try to bring the Palestinian Administration in there and say ‘you take over the civil administration. We are in charge of security.’ The upside of this is that if with US backing, they do that do that, it might be possible to get the Gulf Arabs to foot the bill. Otherwise, who's going to foot the bill for rebuilding Gaza? Recreating some semblance of normalcy after the devastation will be cost intensive. The people who want to destroy Gaza with no ‘day after’ plan, have no answer to that. However, there are some members of the cabinet in Israel who have been arguing that Israel should resettle Gaza. sending back thousands of settlers. And some, the most extreme, are calling for pushing the Palestinian population out. There are about two million people Palestinians in Gaza. Can they simply be driven out?
Egypt has said there is no way the Gaza population will be taken into Sinai. There do not seem to be any answer to this question. It's too big an upheaval to imagine that this can be done. Reactions to it will be very unpredictable internationally. So, right now Israeli strategy as I see it, is that Hamas will have to be reduced to the point where it's either fully disarmed or some ineffective residual elements are left hiding in tunnels. A civil administration without Hamas can be rebuilt.
I don't think any Israeli would be willing to countenance a civil administration role for Hamas. The Palestinian Authority is questionable for many in the Israeli leadership, but that's one way out. But even that will take some time to achieve. For the rest, it's a very serious humanitarian situation bordering on catastrophe.
How the coalition works in Israel is also a big question. Netanyahu's legitimacy and retaining power are also big questions. They're looking at returning to judicial reforms. Will they actually proceed with that course ?. As long as there's actual war, war itself is the first thing on people's minds, other issues may have to wait.
Q: But what about the coalition, sir? Will they support, or will they be extreme right-wingers?
A lot depends on that. The way I read it just now is that Prime Minister Netanyahu is riding two horses at the same time; he's keeping the extremists in his government while holding on to the centre-right. It's a strategy that works when you're at war. It doesn't work if peace breaks out, but right now, this seems to be the main calculation he can get away with.
Q :Frankly, sir, in both the wars taking place in the world, do you think he was at war without thinking of the conflict termination criteria? Do you think Netanyahu has just gone in and doesn't know where to stop it? Or does he have something in mind?
A: This is not clear at present but it looks like the former. I'm not even going towards Russia-Ukraine; that's been going on for a year longer.
Q: So you think he's just gone in like that, sir?
A; I think on the 7th of October, 2023, he had no choice. War was thrust on him; he had to fight a war. As the war aims seem to keep increasing as fighting continues, it seems that the Israeli leaders have not worked out an endgame. Or they have worked out an endgame, which is unrealistic; and they may have to revise it. Largely because of the financial and military constraints I refer to not because their political ambitions have changed.
Q: So, by everything you said, sir, it is safe to presume they didn't just jump headlong into wars. They waited. They waited for some time. Even in this last attack, they carried out over Iran, you said that they pared down their objectives slightly. And after due deliberation, I'm sure it must have happened, that they must have said, okay, we'll not go for the oil, we'll not go for the nukes. At the present moment, we'll not even go for their leadership. We'll go in for something where we can demonstrate the capability that we want. We could have done this. And we could have done the third as well. So they have demonstrated their capability. Sothey took their time and came up with a response to what happened in the first half of, or in the first week of October. Even 200 missiles came down. Same thing I presume they would have done when they went in after the 7th of October also, so last year. So, I'm sure, sir.
A; Yes, of course, you are quite right. But if you look at the situation, if a war is thrust on you, it very often takes a little while. Your first response is to defend. And when you are dealing with a group like Hamas, defence means you break them to the point where they will not dare to try this again—or they are not able to do this again. That was the immediate response. That remains, I think, very much uppermost in their minds. And the systematic destruction of Gaza shows that they have not changed. They seem to say: if we have to destroy this area to get even three Hamas people underground, we will do it. I have a feeling Gaza is different. But for the other two conflicts, with Lebanon and Iran I get the sense they have not thought through their plans fully. What is the endgame?
Q: Thank you. But coming back to this point, you mentioned Iran could have responded. But with what? We know that they don't have an air force—it's been decimated. They all have F-14s, which are hardly serviceable and so ancient.
And nobody can come to their aid, neither China nor Russia at this moment, as far as giving any air power equipment is concerned. And I don't think they will either, as you mentioned rightly about China and Russia. So, other than a few missiles, what do you think? How do you think Iran could have responded to this?
A: In my personal opinion, the Iranians don't have many means at their disposal. They may have the motivation, but I don't think they have the capacity for effective response. Well no, I will amend that, because they still have a fair number of missiles. And there is one thing about the 1st of October attack, which has not been, I think, analysed fully.
We are all hearing the claims of both sides. But if you look at some of the analysis that came out about a week later, both in Israel and in the United States, it suggests to me that a lot of Iranian missiles did hit their targets. There were 63 calls for censorship of reports by the Israeli military. So, the Israeli version that Iranian missiles mostly fell on some desert, and nothing much happened by way of damage, is a bit exaggerated. Everybody is exaggerating. It's always the case in war. But some Iranian missiles did hit their targets.
What is being put out now, is that Iran does not have to try and hit Israel again. They don't have to try to hit the U.S. If they want to create trouble, they could hit the U.S. allies. There is the large US base at Al Udeid in Qatar, which they may not target because Qatar works closely with them. But there are American bases in Iraq. There are American facilities in Bahrain, UAE and other Gulf States. While not US owned, there are still oil facilities in which the Americans have a big stake. If Iran targets them it can create chaos in the Middle East.
That sounds like an absurd strategy, but it is argued that that's what you do if you go down. You threaten and try to take the rest of the area down with you. That is believed to be a form of deterrence; but I do not think the Iranians would choose this route. There are too many uncertainties in that kind of strategy. If they resort to that, the biggest uncertainty would be that be how dangerous the US response would be. If the Americans are attacked, they will respond with devastating force.
Right now, Iran is trying to get support from Arab neighbours. They have gone to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. The Iranian foreign minister and the president have recently been engaging with these leaders to say two things. One, don't allow any Israeli overflights crossing your territory. Syrians can't do anything about it. Iraqis probably can't do anything about it, but the others might try to prevent it.
And second, you must also be supportive of bringing some kind of viable conclusion to this war. Because you also depend on the stability of oil markets and global trade. That would be, I think, the pitch they are making to their Arab neighbours.
They need time to respond if they choose to. They are in trouble. Internally, their regime could be in danger.
Q; Sir, what do you feel about the reputational damage that Israel may have suffered? When we started on the 7th of Othe October last year, by and large, world opinion was in favour of them, that it was sympathetic and that Israelis are the victims of a major terrorist attack. But as we got along, opinion shifted largely possibly because of the methods and the means being used by Israel, which in many ways are very, very questionable. Now we have reached a stage where even beyond Gaza, and to Lebanon and Iran and the surrounding areas So, in the medium term, in the long term, from where Israel started as a victim and is now seen as a perpetrator of war crimes, what do you think will be the reputational damage after that?
A: I think they are in danger of serious reputational damage. But I don't think Iran and Lebanon are involved. It's about Gaza.
And I say this because both Lebanon and Iran have chosen to wage war on Israel. These are wars of choice. There is no real reason for them to be fighting Israel except geopolitical strategy and political strategy. For Palestinians, it's a fight for survival. It's a fight for an independent existence in a land they believe has been taken away from them.
Yes, reputational damage is very serious. Now there are two ways of looking at it. Initially, I think many Israelis would have felt that when it comes to their survival, world opinion has never been terribly concerned. “So we have to do what we have to do. And if it means hiting Hamas and its infrastructure really hard, we'll do that.” But the way the war has carried on causing civilian casualties, and the attacks on some of the targets, including one or two where the Israelis had allowed, if not safe passage, they had allowed people to move. They had given clearance for certain areas, and those areas were attacked. They need to worry about their reputational damage, but it's not global. Their worry is American opinion.
The rest of the world can say what it likes, but it doesn't, in the final analysis, change Israeli politics or the way Israel will react. They, of course, would like to be regarded -like everybody else- as a country and people whom others would like to deal with in normal peaceful exchanges. So yes, to that extent, they're worried about world opinion. But they are, I think, only seriously concerned with US opinion. They are seriously worried that reputational issues will impact politics and future relationships in the United States. The problem concerns the younger people, the universities, who are beginning to change from a traditional approach to Israel. Now, how big is this? Is it really across the US, or are there pockets in some elite universities more amenable to change? One can't say.
If the election, the way it is going, is any indication, Israel’s reputation has not suffered too much. Even Kamala Harris, who started making sympathetic noises about Palestinian casualties, has begun to shift and stick to a very pro-Israel line. So, right now the Israelis feel they are on safe ground. But I think medium to long term they have to worry about how they are seen.
Within Israeli society itself, there's a very important issue which relates to the place of the armed forces in Israeli society. When I was in Israel, I used to know many people in the IDF. They recalled that in Israel’s early years, to survive, in the wars in 1948, 1956, there had been tremendous brutalities. Tremendous brutalities on all sides, including by the Israeli forces. There's no bones about it. Even after things settled somewhat Israel fought wars with all its might, when necessary, brutally.
Nevertheless, Israeli veterans argue: we believed in something called ‘purity of arms’. The IDF had this belief, and the senior generals used to talk about it. You take to arms because you have to. You take to arms because it's your duty. You don't kill for the pleasure of blasting a whole area, destroying a neighbourhood or killing indiscriminately. Israelis see that within the IDF itself, there's a big shift now, with some radical groups entering the army, about whom the less said the better. So, they have to worry.
However right now, the overwhelming feeling in the country is: ‘we were attacked. We were attacked in a way we have not been attacked since the creation of the state of Israel. We had to react. And we have to bring this to a close.’ How is that last objective working out? Initially there were two plans. Netanyahu was to bring the hostages back and to decimate Hamas. Has he been able to achieve either? The decimation of Hamas depends on what you mean by decimate.I think they're reasonably close to making Hamas a fairly ineffective force except for some small uncoordinated guerrilla attacks of the kind, where Colonel Ehsan Dekaa was killed, I think, ten days ago. Even that ability will be degraded. As regards the hostages, I think this latest round in Doha, will provide indication of whether progress can be achieved. If American pressure is strong enough, the Iranians are quiet, we might see a deal in which the hostages are released followed by some kind of ceasefire.
According to my calculations, there will also have to be some steps to restore normalcy in Gaza after the ceasefire. But we don't know yet whether any of this can be achieved.
Q; It's early days. So, going by that, sir, given that as we have seen this develop, Lebanon came into it, sorry, Hezbollah came into it, and then followed by Iran, they came into it because Gaza happened. So, as a result, if Gaza was to win the latest round of talks, it kind of fizzle out, and you said at the beginning of the talk, sir, that Gaza is likely to get contained. That's the word you used, I think, sir. Because if that is going to happen, sir, then would the rest of it also, would it be safe to presume that the rest will also be contained or will it die down?
A: I think it can be contained—at least the Iran-Israel big battle. The current standoff is based on the argument: “you have done what you had to do. Let's just hold it there”. If that argument holds with both sides for a while, it can be contained.
In Lebanon, I think the Israelis would require some further action on 1701; if not its full implementation, at least the part of it, which calls for the removal of the Hezbollah encampments and bases from near their border, if not across the Litani River, at least out of that area. That I think the Israelis will insist on. I don't think these two scenarios are necessarily linked.
As I said, Gaza can blow up at any point. Both Lebanon and Iran have a choice not to pursue war with Israel if they choose not to. They don't have any particular territorial dispute. They also don't have the ideological support in the region that they probably expected. And if Gaza gets resolved, this ideological support will probably not be forthcoming anymore.
But I don't see a solution in Gaza till the hostages are released and some solution is worked out on who will take over the civil administration.
Q: Sir, there's a talk about greater Israel extending from the Nile to the Euphrates. How serious is that, and how do you think the Israeli state is looking at that at any point in time?
A; Some people talk about a really expansive Akhand Bharat, so it's a bit like that. And it's not serious politics, I don't think it should be taken seriously. More worrisome is that a more vociferous group in Israel talks of their homeland from the “river to the sea’. That is usually said to be the Palestinian slogan for their State. But some Israeli extremists have the same version; i.e Israel extending from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean. They are a little more powerful among the settler groups and their politicians and some other radicals in Israel. But ‘Euphrates to the Nile’, this is all just hazy talk of a few. Now, even ‘river to the sea’, in effect, discards the two-state solution. Which is why I don't think it can be on the cards at present.
Q: Sir, you alluded to the UN resolution 1701. Considering that Lebanon allowed Hezbollah to grow and make themselves part of the society and become a legitimate political party in Lebanon, do you think they will have the will and the capacity, including the Lebanese military, who's badly, you know, kind of, we don't see them anywhere. Now that they're making those statements, we need to control them. Do you think they could control Hezbollah?
A: No. They can't do it on their own. They would need an international support force. It has been a difficult demand on every Lebanese government, which-quote allowed-unquote Hezbollah to operate independently. The fact is Hezbollah repeatedly dictated terms to the government in Beirut. Beirut allowed itself to be dictated to because it was so weak and badly divided internally.
As you know, President Macron jumped in and tried to stop the war spreading across Lebanon; and is planning to host international fund raising meetings for Lebanon. France is trying to preserve a sphere of influence; for them, Lebanon is very much part of their old sphere of influence. So, if the Europeans would like to see influence restored, they will have to step in and support the government of Lebanon.
The United States will have to support Lebanon too. And Israel will make sure the resupply of Hezbollah from Iran is curtailed. If these three conditions are met, Lebanon could perhaps find stability and implement the resolutions with UN backing.
But these are very big imponderables, whether it can be done or not is not clear at all. If you just go into the history a little bit, when Lebanon was created, they had this complicated system where the President has to be a Christian, and the Speaker of the parliament is a Shiite, while the Prime Minister is Sunni Muslim. The poor cousin was always the Shiite. They were the most underdeveloped, and so on. So, there was a resistance movement called Amal that grew up there fighting for Shiite rights, though their main battles were in Beirut. The critical conflicts in south Lebanon, where all this fighting is now taking place, was initially between Palestinians and Israel.
Lebanon was dragged into that conflict which expanded after the Israelis carried out incursions in 1978 and 1982; and the Palestinians were pushed out of the area. Later Amal also got sidelined, and Hezbollah was created. Amid the Iran-Iraq war, Iran sent a whole contingent of forces to Lebanon to train and support Hezbollah. Iran then had its back to the wall and was fighting to hold off Iraq, and still, it did it. For them, the geopolitical strategy aimed at bringing large Shiite populations within their sphere of control and a sphere of influence in Lebanon was the first target; Iraq was second. (Lebanon they got because of Lebanon's failures. Iraq, they got because of a guy called Bush who started a war in 2003!)
Coming back to Israel. Their economy is already experiencing some trouble. I mentioned the budget; I mentioned the defence budget.
They will need huge tranches of American support for both. If, by all accounts, the next Congress, irrespective of who is the President, has a very strong Republican presence or even a Republican majority there is likely to be a very strong group supporting greater economic assistance to Israel. That's one thing on which there is virtually no division. Military supplies are a different matter. The United States has a consensus on economic assistance to Israel, but it is also evident that Israel will require that money most critically.
They need to manage their budget, run their social services, keep their defence industries intact, run the civil administration, and support what they are doing outside. However, the drivers of the Israeli economy (since Shimon Peres opened their economy after 1986) have been technology, brain power, and fintech. These are all led by very young people, largely youth-driven industries.
Two aspects have hit the economy. One, many of the bright young minds are fed up with the kind of politics prevalent in Israel. They don't like it; they are going or gone, they are gone to the US.
The second is that this prolonged war has caused change in Israel’s armed force structure strategy. The traditional Israeli strategy was that you kept 100,000 men under arms and brought 500,000 from reserves when there was an emergency. Israel cannot keep 300-400,000 people in uniform for years, because these are the people who have to run the rest of the economy. How long can they maintain large active force levels? Israel can manage emergency budgets, and can rotate soldiers going back into the civilian force, and coming back later. But how long can this be sustained? At some point, the economy will show the strain, and the Prime Minister and Finance Minister will have a problem on their hands.
Right now, that's not so visible. More visible is the flight of brainpower to New York. Already, people are complaining about it and warning about it.
Something will have to be done about the Houthis involvement in this conflict. The Houthis are creating trouble for transport to Europe and the US from the Middle East, and they have sent up import and export prices, even from India. Many exporters are incurring additional costs to circumnavigate the Cape. There is a global need for containment of their war on shipping.
I think the Houthis, like the Hezbollah, have a tremendous ability to fight on their own turf. If attacked on the ground, in their hills, Sanaa, or somewhere close, they will fight effectively. But to be able to lob missiles from Yemen, go over the sea and land in Israel, is not a capacity based on domestic production. Though it has been reported that they have the capacity to refurbish and put together unexploded rockets. Hamas did that; they took parts of Israeli unexploded ammunition and created weapons out of it. The Houthis can do some of that ‘jugaad’ too, but they can't sustain a long missile war if Iran chooses to call a halt
I recently read an interesting report that when the Iranians approached Saudi Arabia for joint exercises as confidence building measures, the Saudis made a very interesting proposal. They suggested a joint naval exercise in the Red Sea. The Red Sea is right next to the Houthis. So if Iran is serious and takes up joint naval exercises in the Red Sea the Houthis will have to keep restraint. From the Iranian perspective I think the Houthis are far more manageable, because the focus of the latter and their problems, are in Yemen itself. The Houthis involvement in the conflict with Israel is only ideological and as an extension of Iranian power.
Q: Sir, bringing the discussion back to India, how do you think India has handled this whole thing diplomatically, and what is India's final, best-case scenario for India? That is at a diplomatic level. However, as a society, we seem to be quite indifferent to this conflict. Are there any reasons for that?
A: I retain some loyalty to my old fraternity, so I can't complain. But seriously I think we have handled it reasonably well. There are two aspects to it . We have, I think, maintained our largely traditional approach of not being completely on one side or the other. The complaint that has been made, which is a justifiable complaint, is that we have not been vocal enough in support of the Palestinians when they have suffered serious civilian casualties. There's a fair point to that.
There would have been no harm in making our views on humanitarian issues known. But we have repeatedly said that if there is a serious international effort to provide relief, we are willing to support it. But not much international effort has been made, apart from that of the UN to some extent. I believe if there are international initiatives we would join them. Secondly, there is a very strong ideological sense in the government today that we need to be more supportive of Israel. To that extent, this is a change from earlier times.
But there's one element that goes across politics, and that is, when you have a terrorist attack of the kind which we faced in November 2008, you acquire a hatred for and a sense of horror about terrorism. I think that runs very deep, including among most of the decision-makers. The October 7th terror attacks did inevitably impact India’s attitude and policy stances over the medium-term, not just for a few days.
I have read that there are people in Delhi who see parallels between Sinwar (who had to be released after 20 years in Israeli jails, when the Hamas had enough Israeli hostages) and the terrorists with long records of causing mayhem against us, who we were forced to release when we had no other way to get our people back from Kandahar. That's not a very happy thing you like to be reminded of, so goes the claim. I don't know whether that's entirely true or not, but certainly, terrorism and the need to be very firmly opposed to terrorism are strong convictions among many circles in our government. As a society, I think we need to take more interest in the humanitarian dimension, but are limited partly because we are overwhelmed by our own problems.
Q: Actually, if you monitor social media, the reaction in India is also split among religious groups. It's very evident how one section of the community paints the Palestinian flag andhow the others… Social media is the actual mirror of what's happening. And as you said, the terror attack, you know, some people are justifying on the grounds of because of 7th October, go three decades back, two decades, it was brutal. So that's I don't think many people accept that explanation.
A: Certainly not. I think most people do not accept the justification. Even if you find understandable the argument that Hamas faced a situation on the 7th of October last year when the rest of the world was doing nothing to help the Palestinians, the conflict was frozen and Hamas was frozen in Gaza; the world had forgotten about Palestinian suffering in the West Bank, and the encroachment by settlers which was driving Palestinians to the wall. Hamas had to respond at some point, otherwise, the rest of West Asia would be happy doing deals with Israel. And projects like IMEC and the Abraham Accords were being talked about seriously. Even Iran was preoccupied with its own issues, and the whole world was carrying on ignoring the Palestinian plight.
So Hamas say they had to shake up the status quo. The problem is when you shake it up and pay a price for your strategy. And the price has been terrible for people in Gaza.
Q: Sir, I just wanted to ask, how do you think the prolonged conflict on so many different fronts has affected the sectarian divide in West Asia between Shia and Sunni, if I may ask?
A: Sectarian divide is a fact of life. But I don't think that has been a predominant element in this war over the last year. Except to this extent: the Iranians believe that a lot of the major Arab countries have not reacted to Lebanon the way they reacted to Gaza, partly because they feel Lebanon is Iran's problem. The war there is a Shiite problem created by Iran. Whereas Gaza is everybody's problem. So, to that extent, yes, the divide has shown up.
Nevertheless, in my view, the sectarian divide has not exacerbated the conflict in any particular way. If anything, the containment of the conflict, if achieved by reducing Iran's ability to project its power outside, will make a lot of people very happy in the rest of the Arab world. It is worth recalling the worries expressed earlier about the Shiite Crescent, which extends from Iran to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.
That concern still exists up to some point. This is another fact which I mentioned in one of the talks I gave earlier. People have forgotten that when Hezbollah joined the war in Syria on the side of the regime against some Sunni extremist groups (or liberation groups, name them as you will), it carried out huge atrocities against the civilian population there. And when Nasrallah was killed there was cheering and clapping in the cities of Idlib and Aleppo. That divide is real.
Remarks from the Israeli Representative.
And I agree with your analysis and what you've said. There are a few points that I do feel that I have to, as an Israeli representative, have to say. The first is, I think, and the most important was to say that I still think that every Israeli believes, and I, I say this both as a diplomatic representative and as an Israeli, that armed forces are still, we believe that we act in self-defence.
And I think that we, as you portrayed it, I don't remember the exact words that you used, that we fight because we have to fight. And there's no other reason that we're fighting. And I think that many of the atrocities that we're seeing in Gaza it wasn't mentioned here. Still, I think it's an important point to keep in mind always that this is, we're dealing both in Lebanon and in Gaza, but especially talking about Hamas and what's happening in Gaza with an organisation that uses its people.
I think that a lot of the tragedies that we're seeing in Gaza, and they're tragic, and a lot of people in Israel are aware of these tragedies, and it hurts us to see this, but it's not to do with Israel. It's to do with the fact that we're fighting against an organisation that has no problem using its people in self-defence. And I think it's also, to another point that you made, about why the attack had to shake up because the world had sort of forgotten about Gaza.
I think that, again, we have to remember that in 2005, Israel disconnected from Gaza and completely exited Gaza. There were no Israeli forces since 2005 in Gaza. And in 2007, Hamas took over, and they had a choice.
The Palestinian leadership had a choice. Do we create a Singapore where we invest in Gaza, create tourism, create schools, and create a life for the people of Gaza? Because Israel wasn't there at all. There were no Israeli forces, completely one-sided, disconnected because we felt that we shouldn't be there.
Or do we invest everything that we have (All the money that came into Gaza was invested) to fight Israel, to create tunnels, to create an underground city?. So, to use that as an excuse, the world forgot about it. Maybe the world realised that the leadership there chose not to invest in itself.
It had the choice. It could have been a completely different situation with a different leadership in Gaza. This leadership chose not to invest in people and to invest in the well-being of their people instead of investing in one aim: to destroy Israel. It's not that they're fighting for a country of their well-being to accept a two-state solution. They aim to destroy Israel. They say it outright. They feel that Israel has no right to exist.
A: You know, one point the Consul-General made is important. In 2005, when Ariel Sharon made the decision that Israel would withdraw from Gaza, it wasn't an easy operation. There were settlers there who refused to move. Sharon sent in the IDF and physically removed them, physically caught them, picked them up, and took them out of that territory. They had to do it to implement their policy decision and they did it.
But that was in a different Israel. It had leaders. Irrespective of what you think of his politics, Ariel Sharon was one of those. I say this based on my experience. The leaders at that time were people who created the state of Israel. They created it with bare hands.They knew what it meant to survive and what it meant to compromise for survival. Some of today's Israelis are very different. That's all. We'll leave it there.
Thank you.
Tags: #Synergiafoundation #Insights #Middleeast #Crisis #IsraelGaza #War #Diplomacy #India
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