Assassinations of proscribed enemy leaders with surgical precision remain Israel's forte, but is that an end-all?
A hallmark of Israeli security policy has beenthe strategic targeting of top leadership of its enemies anywhere in the world. Soon after independence, it was Nazi war criminals in the crosshairs and now the numerous militant organisations that relentlessly wage war against the Israeli state. The Israeli Security Establishment takes pride in calling the top leaders of its enemies "Dead Men Walking”- Yahya Sinwar, who has reportedly assumed command of Hamas, bears this unwelcome sobriquet now!
The subject has resurfaced in a global debate with the recent spurt in targeted attacks, most prominent being Ismail Haniyeh, a top Hama leader blown into smithereens while safely ensconced in the high-security official guest house of the IRGC in the heart of Teheran. Different theories have emerged about how the deed was done; the New York Times (4 Aug 24) broke a story that an explosive device planted by agents approximately two months ago was remotely detonated at the precise moment Mr Haniyeh entered his room after the presidential inauguration ceremonies where international media feted him.
Recently, one of Haniyeh’s surviving sons (in April, an Israeli missile strike killed three of his sons and four grandchildren) claimed that it was a missile that zeroed on the smartphone signal emitting from the guest room, presumably from Mr Haniyeh's own mobile. We may never know the truth as neitherthe Iranians are talking nor the alleged perpetrator (Israel?).
Only a few hours earlier, a missile strike on a Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut killed a top Hezbollah commander. This time, Israel officially celebrated it, putting this news on the X, calling it a revenge strike for the rocket that Hezbollah fired on the Golan Heights, killing 12 children.
A Well HewnModus Operandi
Israel has perfected the art of ‘targeted killings’ or ‘decapitation strikes,’applying it over the years to Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad to take out their leadership. It has made this strategy its primary counterterrorism technique. High-priority targets are identified and tracked with the latest technology using latest ISR technology before being struck down by the proverbial bolt from the blue. The intentionis to destabilise the command-and-control structure, albeit temporarily, making it less effective.
The roots of targeted killing can be traced back to the founding of Israel as a modern state, post the creation of the Palestine Mandate after World War I. During its genesis, the nation adopted targeted killing as its counterterrorism strategy. Nazi war criminals hiding in far-off South America and Arab militants were designated enemies of the state, and assassins despatched to find and fix them, especially during the turbulent 1950s and 1960s. After the massacre of 11 Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics, a secret Israeli committee chaired by Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defence Minister Moshe Dayan is said to have authorised the assassination of everyone directly or indirectly involved with Black September. This Fatah-affiliated group had orchestrated the Munich killings. The events have been graphically recorded in a hit Hollywood Movie appropriately named, “Munich.”
During and after the Second Intifada, the strategy of ‘targeted killings’ was used extensively in unique and innovative ways. They primarily focused on the elimination of the leadership of the Palestinian military group.
A Vicious Cycle of Violence
More importantly, targeted killings are only short-term tactical victories and do not contribute to strategic gains or lasting solutions. Rampant assassinations of top leaders, critics have argued, lead to uninvited consequences, further resulting in more radical figures, increased violence and regional instability. However, terror groups are not driven by personalities; after a brief consolidation period, most spring back into action. No one knows this better than the Israelis, but with few other military options, they continue to persist.
In 2004, Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual head and founder of Hamas, was followed by a drone, marking him with an invisible laser. Hellfire missiles were fired from a loitering F-16 jet, killing the leader and several others around him; while the intention was to eliminate the leader and weaken Hamas militarily and ideologically, Israel made a martyr out of the leader, giving birth to decades of violence.
Similar assassinations have been carried out outside Palestinian territories. Imad Mughniyeh, the military commander of Hezbollah, was assassinated in similar circumstances. Several Western countries, along with Israel, were victims of Mughniyeh's brutal violence, and his death was translated into victory in Israel. However, Hezbollah successfully reorganised itself and continued more military strikes and operations.
With the media and press revolving around high-profile assassinations, many intellectuals have questioned its legal and moral accountability on a domestic and international level. Apart from perpetuating a vicious and violent cycle, targeted killings also open Israel to a series of vulnerabilities in the future. Spectacular assassinations make for good copy and even better movies. However, when states go beyond the pale of internationally accepted legal norms, they run the risk of being designated rogue nations and can be sanctioned by international bodies. Targeted killings violate International Law and can be viewed as extrajudicial executions. The ICJ has already issued arrest warrants for the Israeli Prime Minister and his defence minister, making them logically fugitives if they visit any of the signatory states.
The unwillingness to compromise has also put Israel in a very isolating stance. Selective targeted killingonce in a while can be justified as exercising the right to self-defence. But if exploited as a nationalstrategy, global organisations and human rights organisations will not hesitate to condemn Israel. Israel's negative perception has grown, potentially undermining its diplomatic efforts.
In 2008 in Operation Cast Lead, IDF targeted topHamas operatives and infrastructure. However, the high civilian enraged the International Community and Human Rights organisations, swinging their support in favour of Palestine. Several ethical questions were also raised after the operation. Critics, both within and outside Israel, have severely criticised these methods for causing mindless collateral damage and killing civilians, exacerbating tensions and encouraging further radicalisation.
The discourse of its effectiveness is still very contested. Its advocates argue that it has been a significant deterrent in dismantling terrorist plots before they were launched. The receding large-scale attacks on Israeli soil are used as an indicator to streamline this policy further. Critiques highlight the strategy's superficial nature, emphasising its effectiveness on the symptoms rather than the root cause.
What is the End Game
Israel’s strategy of targeting the top guns of terror organisations reveals its multifaceted approach to its national security. It is built on the premisethat eliminating key top figures will result in a power vacuum, weakening the organisation’s integrity. There is a strong element of psychological warfare that keeps the enemy in a constant state of fear and suspicion.
But sometimes it can backfire. In certain quarters, Ismail Haniyeh was considered a moderate leader and was reportedly pushing for a return of hostages to usher in an early ceasefire in Gaza. If this is true, then efforts towards a ceasefire will definitely be adversely impacted. Many claim that his assassination was deliberately orchestrated by Prime Minister Netanyahu, who does not want a cessation of hostilities to sustain his own political survival. There are ultra-right-wing ministers in the current cabinet who would like the Hamas to be obliterated, whatever and however long it takes.
Such killings can certainly abort short-term attacks and fudge immediate plans. In the case of Hamas and Hezbollah, both organisations were left in a sudden state of shock and disarray. Additionally, eliminating hardened leaders like Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Imad Mughniyeh impairs the group's ideological and motivational core, resulting in challenges to group cohesion. However, the long-term effectiveness of this strategy is debatable, as the enemy will certainly get an idea of it and keep second tier of leadership trained and prepared for such contingencies. After all, amidst conventional military forces also the death of the commander no longer leads to a rout, as was the outcome in ancient warfare.
On the other hand, experts have observed a rallying effect after a targeted killing, invigorating the support for the group and improving its popularity among its base. The assassinations of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Ismail Haniyeh have only hardened Hama’s determination and reinforced the narrative development of martyrdom and victimhood, useful to attract fresh recruits to the cause.
Assessing Israel’s end game will require one to consider the strategy of targeted killings and its alignment with the nation's long-term goals. For long-lasting peace, purely military intervention will not be enough. An exhaustive approach with a blend of diplomatic engagements and economic outreach to bridge the gap will be necessary to complement the military efforts.
Within the context of the conflict, the continued hostilities towards Palestine seemed reasonable; however, with the hostages present in the same localities as the Hamas operative, differentiation between hostages and terrorists might pose some challenges. The past has seen Hamas taking hostages (but not on this scale)and Israel successfully manoeuvring them back. This time, the scales are vastly different.
Key Assessment
Israel
seems at a loss in crafting an
end game because its opponent
s
keep changing the rules of the game. H
aving said that, aimless and mindless killing will only harbour more
s
ecurity challenges for an already insecure nation.
The responses from all stakeholders highlight the potential for increased violence and destabilisation. Thankfully, Iran's retaliation has not yet come, so peace in the region holds for the time being. But for how long?
It is paramount that Israel considers the potential for unintended ramifications, including the birth of more radical elements coupled with the exacerbation of the conflict while engineering its targeted killing policy.
Ending Hamas through brute military force is a utopian dream; violence only begets violence and will result in generational radicalisation with a rejuvenated hatred for Israel. Israel needs to have a more realistic way of ‘Ending Hamas’ even if it has to shed its decades-held belief in not surrendering land that it considers the promised one.
