Allies in Uncertainty
Missile capabilities are quietly building up as regional tensions demand strategic and diplomatic planning.
(Tarini Dhar Prabhu, Research Associate, Synergia Foundation, She holds a law degree (BA LLB) from Symbiosis Law School, Pune. )
The Indo-Pacific is a simmering cauldron. A potentially serious threat to security looms large with missiles building up. As China, Russia, and North Korea tighten ties, the U.S. stands to play an important role in maintaining the regional balance of power. Under Trump 2.0, cooperation between the U.S. and its allies in the region may face hurdles.
Missiles Are Key.
In August 2019, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union officially expired. This landmark agreement had prohibited both nations from deploying ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. The termination of the treaty has since triggered a subdued yet significant arms race, with far-reaching implications for global security.
Under the administration of former President Joe Biden, the U.S. military capitalised on the treaty’s expiration to develop, test, and deploy new ground-launched missile systems. While these systems could enhance U.S. strategic capabilities, particularly in potential conflicts with adversaries such as China, they also risk provoking countermeasures that could escalate tensions and increase the likelihood of nuclear confrontation. This delicate balance underscores the dual nature of such advancements: while longer-range systems may offer tactical advantages, they also pose significant risks to regional and global stability.
The post-INF arms race has seen the U.S. accelerate its missile development programs, while China and North Korea have simultaneously expanded and modernised their missile arsenals. In response, U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region, including South Korea, Japan, and Australia, have also begun developing their own missile systems, further intensifying the regional arms dynamic.
The U.S. has continued to bolster its conventional military capabilities in the region, exemplified by the deployment of advanced systems such as the Dark Eagle hypersonic missile on Guam. However, to counterbalance China’s growing conventional military power, the U.S. may need to station additional medium-range missile systems on the territories of its regional allies. This strategy, while potentially effective from a military standpoint, carries significant risks. In the event of a conflict, Beijing is likely to respond not only militarily but also economically, targeting the host nations of such deployments. Given the potential for severe economic repercussions, it is unlikely that key U.S. allies like Australia, Japan, and South Korea would readily agree to such arrangements, further complicating the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific.
High Stakes Decisions.
According to an article in Foreign Policy (February 18, 2025), the U.S. services have swiftly deployed new systems in the Indo-Pacific without a guiding political or military strategy to steer what are now high-stakes decisions about deploying and using these systems. In 2022, members of the US House of Representatives raised concerns that the army had invested heavily in ground-launched missiles intended for Asia without the diplomatic agreements required to employ missiles in the region in a war.The army’s determination to build missile capabilities in the Indo-Pacific offers operational benefits but comes with risks too. The capabilities not only increase the available firepower in a crisis but also lead to strikes against the allies that host the missiles.
In other words, in the instance of a crisis such as the invasion of Taiwan, China might be more likely to target Japan or the Philippines if they were hosting US intermediate-range missile systems. It may prompt China, North Korea, and Russia to grow alarmed and belligerent.
Security Concerns About Trump 2.0.
Indo-Pacific powers like Southeast Asian countries and particularly Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as India are going to closely watch the new administration and what it bodes for regional security dynamics.
U.S. allies may have to adjust to less support from Washington towards regional security. Trump’s lack of commitment towards formal institutions could put some pressure on the Quad (Australia, the U.S., Japan, and India) and AUKUS (Australia, the UK, and the U.S.). The involved countries may have to work more closely with each other to offset a diverging US trajectory in regional security.
However, it is worth noting that Quad held talks for the first time in 2017, during the first Trump administration. Concerns abound that Trump may pressure allies to make concessions.
For instance, Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demanding higher financial contributions from Seoul towards stationing U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula, accompanied by threats to withdraw forces. Security commitments could be used to extract economic concessions such as in trade. Australia and Japan may worry that the new government will seek to renegotiate military procurement deals. However, it is highly unlikely that the agreements will be revoked.
Trump’s approach towards China and North Korea remains ambiguous. His recent conciliatory behavior with Russia raises questions as to how he will deal with autocratic governments and whether he will look to cut a deal.
While he may very well adopt confrontational security and economic policies towards China, he may also seek a grand deal with Xi Jinping. Trump’s stance on Taiwan is not certain—he may abandon all support for Taiwan or staunchly commit to defending it. The former may unsettle the regional balance and subject Indo-Pacific nations to Beijing’s coercion.
The Japan-South Korea-US Alliance.
The Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral carries strategic importance. It enables the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies to jointly approach regional challenges and develop coordinated responses to provocations and threats. The threats arising from China, North Korea, and Russia demand stronger deterrence capabilities, which requires painstaking diplomacy, as an article by Chatham House (February 20, 2025) points out.
Under the Biden administration, the U.S. made an effort to build bridges between two of its closest allies in the region, to overcome longstanding differences to enable better security cooperation. Under Trump, trilateral cooperation may struggle through the possible bilateral demands that Trump makes. This could include issues like cost-sharing of U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea, military expenditure, and balance of trade.
Is It Really a Big Deal?
While Europe wrings its hands trying to figure out how to deal with Trump 2.0, for the U.S.’ Indo-Pacific allies, it may not be such a big deal. The fear that the U.S. could withdraw its security assurances is not absent but it’s not as marked. There is a shared understanding that there is a need to contain China and this requires allies across the Pacific. Of course, concerns about a highly transactional approach persist, namely that it could undermine shared efforts to counter China’s growing dominance in the strategically important region through national and joint deterrence and defense.
Yet, despite Trump’s aversion to multilateral treaties and alliances (like NATO), his previous administration was willing to form bilateral agreements that aligned with U.S. interests.
This pattern suggests that Trump 2.0 may not dismantle all alliances but recalibrate and prioritise partnerships that directly contribute to US objectives. To counter China, working with ASEAN and other Indo-Pacific partners like Japan, Australia, and India (as in the Quad) could prove an important exception to a wider pattern of withdrawing from traditional alliances.
Regional Cooperation Is Essential.
As North Korea, China, and Russia strengthen ties, security concerns in the region make trilateral cooperation all the more important.
The South China Sea, a vital shipping route for global trade, has become a hotbed for territorial disputes and military tensions as Beijing intensifies its military activity. Allowing trilateral cooperation to degrade could embolden North Korea, China, and Russia and take away from strategic deterrence.
With the risk of nuclear war present, the U.S. government needs to engage in strategic dialogue domestically and with allies in the region towards assessing the value and risks that come with new missiles.
Some of this was initiated under the Biden administration with Japan, South Korea, and Australia; the Trump administration should further this endeavour.
India remains an important partner to the U.S. in the region, given its role in maintaining the balance of power. U.S.-Indian ties have a strong institutional basis such as in the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, India’s Major Defence Partner status, and four strategic agreements, including real-time intelligence sharing in the Indo-Pacific. These factors form a strong foundation upon which an expanded relationship can be built.
Conclusion .
The missile build-up in the Indo-Pacific needs to be guided and streamlined by military and political strategy, in cohesion with diplomatic efforts.
The U.S. stands to play a crucial role in the Indo-Pacific as regional security hangs in the balance and Trump’s approach towards China and North Korea remains ambiguous. Strategic deterrence is key but it should not take the form of escalatory actions that set off worst-case thinking and belligerent reactions.
