Contours of Conflict: India’s Security Horizon
This article is based on the author’s speech at the Army Western Command seminar on “Global and Regional Powers in Indo-Pak Relations.”
(Mr. M.K Narayanan, Former National Security Adviser, India)
The post-1945 global order in this region has witnessed significant transformations, particularly in West Asia. Major powers such as the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom have actively sought to establish spheres of influence. The region west of Asia, historically regarded as an area of Indian influence, experienced considerable upheaval. Over time, this influence waned, supplanted by a series of enduring internal conflicts. In South Asia, Western powers strategically positioned Pakistan as a counterweight to curb India’s rise. Similarly, in the Middle East, the creation of the Zionist state has resulted in sustained violence and recurring external interventions, predominantly from Western nations.
Turning specifically to West Asia, this region remains of critical strategic importance to India, particularly concerning the Armed Forces and broader civilisational interests. The mid-1970s witnessed the emergence of Iran as a significant regional actor, marked by the rise of Shia influence. This shift precipitated intense Shia-Sunni rivalries, progressively weakening other civilisational forces in the region.
More recently, a significant strategic shift has occurred. The attack by Hamas on Israel elicited a severe and near-genocidal response from the Israeli state, triggering consequences that continue to unfold. The decline of the Alawite Assad regime in Syria, coupled with the rise of a Sunni government, has further complicated the regional landscape.
This transition is contributing to a gradual decline in Shia Iran’s influence, accompanied by the resurgence of Sunni Islam. The immediate impact of these dynamics is the weakening of Shia Iran’s regional foothold and the concurrent ascendancy of Sunni influence.
A concerning development across the Middle East is the rising intolerance towards non-Abrahamic religions. This trend is likely to have far-reaching and long-term implications for the region and beyond. While the immediate impact on India may be limited, it is essential to recognise that these developments significantly constrain India’s strategic manoeuvrability. Islamist militancy remains resilient, and the strategic climate to India’s west is increasingly disadvantageous. It is, therefore, imperative for India’s Armed Forces to monitor these developments closely. Closer to home, Pakistan continues to pose a persistent strategic challenge. While it is my assessment that the immediate threat levels from Pakistan may have diminished to some extent, underlying tensions persist. Pakistan’s strategic posture, particularly in relation to China, is likely to remain a constant factor. Although internal turmoil and tensions with Afghanistan have somewhat constrained Pakistan’s capacity to project power, particularly beyond its borders, the threat remains relevant.
Moreover, it is increasingly evident that Pakistan’s traditional support structures, including military aid from Western nations, have weakened. While Pakistan retains its designation as a non-NATO ally, it has been sidelined from the primary and secondary tiers of the Western ‘arc of aid.’ Despite this, Pakistan’s covert and below-the-radar capabilities cannot be underestimated, especially given its strategic posturing towards China. Therefore, while the intensity of Pakistan’s threat may have lessened, it remains a significant strategic concern, and India must maintain vigilance and preparedness.
The internal turmoil within Pakistan, coupled with ongoing tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, has inevitably impacted Pakistan’s capacity to project military power—both regionally and, to a lesser extent, in its engagement with India.
Furthermore, it is increasingly evident that Pakistan is unlikely to receive the same level of military support, particularly in terms of weaponry, from Western powers as it has in the past. While it retains its designation as a non-NATO ally, Pakistan is no longer considered within the primary or secondary tiers of the Western ‘arc of aid.’
However, drawing upon extensive experience in intelligence and national security, I must caution against underestimating Pakistan’s covert and ‘below-the-radar’ capabilities, particularly in the context of potential nuclear conflict. Counter-force targeting forms an integral part of Pakistan’s strategic doctrine. Notably, Pakistan claims its nuclear arsenal has a range extending from 0 to 27,500 kilometres.
While the upper range is understandable—covering the entirety of India—the concept of a zero-range capability is both ambiguous and concerning. This raises critical questions about Pakistan’s strategic intentions. Therefore, while Pakistan’s capacity to wage conventional war may have diminished, its determination to do so remains steadfast. Consequently, India’s armed forces must remain perpetually vigilant and prepared.
Turning to the India-China dynamic, it is important to recognise that the nature of the challenge posed by China is fundamentally different from that presented by Pakistan.
China’s approach towards its Asian neighbours is characterised by an ambition for regional hegemony. This was made explicit by President Xi Jinping during China’s 19th Party Congress, where he referred to China as a “great power” no fewer than 25 times. He further declared that China possessed a world-class military, capable of winning wars. It is critical to acknowledge that contemporary China is markedly different from the China of Deng Xiaoping’s era.
During Deng’s leadership, India and China arguably enjoyed their most stable relationship. Deng Xiaoping famously advised China to “coolly observe, calmly deal with matters, conceal capabilities, bide time, and accomplish things where possible.” However, this cautious posture has given way to an assertive and proactive foreign policy. The threat posed by China today is, therefore, both tangible and immediate. Currently, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stands as the largest single standing army in the world, equipped with advanced stealth bombers. The PLA Navy ranks as the world’s second-largest naval force, possessing an extensive fleet of nuclear-armed submarines. Moreover, China’s armed forces are increasingly adept at navigating and responding to contemporary geopolitical realities. However, it is important to contextualise China’s strategic outlook. In its broader worldview, China perceives the United States as its principal adversary, with India not directly factored into this equation. Nevertheless, within the Asian context, China views India as a competitor for regional influence. Thus, the contest between India and China is, at its core, a civilisational struggle. It is a competition for influence, rooted in historical and strategic imperatives. As practitioners of realpolitik and as members of the armed forces, it is imperative to remain alert and prepared for potential conflict with China.
History offers a stark lesson in the events of 1962, when India was caught unprepared. I must candidly acknowledge my own role during that period, admitting that I was among those who failed to anticipate the unfolding crisis. Although an all-out conflict with China may not be imminent, preparation remains paramount. Complacency is a risk India cannot afford. The evolving geopolitical climate, coupled with China’s growing assertiveness, demands that India’s strategic posture be one of vigilance, resilience, and preparedness.
In considering the potential for conflict with China, it is essential to recognise that while an all-out war may not be imminent, strategic focus must be directed towards two critical areas—Aksai Chin in the Ladakh region and parts of Arunachal Pradesh. Aksai Chin holds strategic importance for China as it facilitates access to Tibet and Xinjiang.
Meanwhile, Arunachal Pradesh, particularly the region surrounding the renowned Tawang Buddhist Monastery, presents additional strategic considerations. Beyond its religious significance, the region possesses substantial water resources that could be critical for the arid Tibetan plateau. It is important to distinguish these focal points from the intermittent skirmishes witnessed in regions such as Doklam and the Galwan Valley.
These confrontations are symptomatic of a broader Chinese strategic mindset, which is deeply influenced by historical territorial claims. China has exhibited a consistent determination to retain any territory historically depicted in its dynastic maps.During my tenure as India’s Special Representative for border talks with China, I encountered a recurring pattern wherein Chinese-produced maps, dating back to various dynasties, were presented as evidence of territorial claims. When I questioned the veracity of these claims, my Chinese counterpart candidly admitted, “We ourselves are not very clear, but every dynasty decides to have a map about the limits of its territory.” This illustrates the historical ambiguity China leverages to substantiate its territorial assertions—a perennial challenge India must navigate. Nevertheless, such confrontations, while serious, should not be misinterpreted as indicators of impending large-scale conflict.
It is also pertinent to reflect on the evolving nature of warfare. While traditional conflict dynamics, such as those characterising engagements between India and Pakistan, may remain relatively constant, future conflicts with China will be markedly different. The proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping the very nature of warfare, altering the control dynamics on land, sea, and air. In the current paradigm, airspace dominance is increasingly influenced by the widespread use of small, cost-effective drones, as exemplified by the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. This trend underscores the growing importance of autonomous systems in redefining the dynamics of aerial superiority.
Moreover, the emergence of generative AI represents a transformative development that will redefine not only warfare but every facet of human existence. As someone with experience in AI, I contend that this technology will fundamentally reshape future conflicts. In this context, victory and defeat may become indistinct—akin to “two seeds in the same pot.” Although China claims a technological advantage in AI, India is advancing rapidly and is not far behind. No nation, including China, possesses a definitive technological advantage capable of guaranteeing a decisive victory.
Future conflicts will no longer be confined to a single domain. Ground, aerial, and submarine warfare will be extensively influenced by AI, potentially neutralising traditional strategic advantages. In the event of an India-China conflict, it is improbable that external powers would decisively side with either nation. India must, therefore, be prepared to fight its own battles. It is unlikely that China would receive substantial external support, nor can India rely on historical alliances. The India-Russia strategic partnership, as well as China’s evolving alignment with Russia, are unlikely to decisively influence outcomes. In the final analysis, India’s ultimate strength lies in the readiness, resilience, and capabilities of its Armed Forces.
